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Wednesday, July 30, 2014

Iraq Conflict Update: 30th July, 2014


The Kurdish politician, Faoud Massoum, was appointed to the Iraqi presidency by the Iraqi parliament on 24th July. The appointment of both speaker Salim Abdullah al-Jabouri, elected on July 15th, and president (see below for biographies of both men) shows that the Iraq parliament has begun taking important steps towards choosing a stable government and putting an end to the parliamentary deadlock. However, a deal has yet to be brokered for the appointment of the powerful position of prime minister. Under Iraq’s constitution the President now has to ask a premier to attempt to form a government (presumably not before 5th August when parliament reconvenes). However it seems increasingly difficult for caretaker premier Nouri al Maliki to retain power. Grand Ayatollah Sistani gave his clearest indication yet that he does not support a further term for Nouri al Maliki when he said in a sermon on Friday that politicians should not cling to power. Sistani said it is time for politicians to think of Iraq’s interests, not their own: “The sensitivity of this phase necessitates that all the parties concerned should have a spirit of national responsibility that requires the practice of the principle of sacrifice and self-denial and not to cling to positions and posts.”

Baghdad
Following the election of Faoud Massoum, two car bombs exploded in Baghdad’s central area Karradeh, killing 21 people and injuring many more. 

Salah ad-Din Province
Many dead and injured following an Iraqi Army airstrike targeting insurgents in the region between Suleiman Beg and the Turkman village of Amerli.

Rebels still hold the Baiji oil refinery despite claims that 300 insurgents have been killed in the fighting.

A building in the Al-Qadisiya region of Tikrit functioning as an HQ for IS, was hit by an airstrike by the Iraq air force. However an offensive by the Iraq Army has thus far failed to retake the city.
                                                                                      
Dozens were wounded and killed in an airstrike on insurgents in Al Dhuluiya.

Anbar Province
Syrian fighter aircraft targeted IS fighters in Rawah.

Between Al-Karmah and Abu Ghraib, there have been clashes between insurgents and the army. A number were killed by an airstrike targeting insurgents in Al-Shorta.

A number were killed in clashes between insurgents and the Iraq security forces in Al-Saqlaqiya and Al-Karmah near Fallujah. Clashes were also reported west of Ramadi.
  
Diyala Province
Clashes in the Tajneed district of Jalawla; Nofal village near al-Muqdadiya; East of Baquba; and West of Baquba in the Katoon district. A number killed (though Baquba, the capital of Diyala province, remains firmly in government hands, many of the surrounding Sunni villages change hands frequently). 

Controversially, Iraq security forces shelled orchards adjacent to the Diyala River near Buhriz. Airstrikes in the area also targeted insurgents in an attempt to halt their advance further towards Baghdad.

Ninevah Province
An air strike of the Iraq Army on the airbases of Tal Afar and Qayyara.

On the outskirts of Sinjar dozens of Kurdish Yezidi families were forced to flee their homes following an insurgent attack. IS continues to target the Yazidi, Shabak and Christian communities of the Ninevah region.

Biographies of Faoud Massoum and Salim Abdullah al-Jabouri

Faoud Massoum, President of Iraq
Faoud Massoum (76 years old) is dignified, mature, well respected throughout Kurdistan, and is head of the Kurdistan bloc in the Iraqi parliament.  Self-effacing and quietly mild mannered, he was born Muhammad Fouad Massoum Hawrami in Koye in the Erbil governorate in Northern Iraq in 1938. His parents came from the Hawraman area and his father was a notable cleric. He is a close confident of Jalal Talabani and the both of them are from prominent religious families and grew up in the same town. He and Talabani would go on to establish the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) in 1975.

Massoum studied at Kurdish religious schools and in 1958 he began studies at Egypt’s prestigious Al-Azhar University, where he earned his undergraduate and graduate degrees in Islamic studies, and later his PhD.

Massoum was a member of the Iraqi Communist Party, which he left early in his career to join the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in 1964. He also taught at the University of Basra and was in charge of the KDP's military operations in Iraqi Kurdistan in the late 60s.

Massoum was a representative of the KDP and Mustafa Barzani in Cairo between 1973-75 before helping to found the new PUK. In the 1980s, he used his connections to help the KDP and PUK reconcile. In 1992, he became the first prime minister of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), replaced by the aggressive Kosrat Rasul who went on to attack the Islamists (Dec 1993) and fight the KDP during the mid 1990s, now vice president next to Masoud. During the mid-1990's KDP-PUK conflict he was captured by the KDP (the PUK forgot him when Iraqi forces entered Erbil in August 1996), taken very good care of and offered the opportunity to stay or return to the PUK.  He returned.

He was strongly opposed to Saddam Hussein and was involved in the drafting of the new Iraqi constitution following the invasion in 2003.

In 2004, he became the first speaker of the interim Iraqi parliament, and the year after he became an Iraqi MP. Apart from his other duties, Massoum has supervised the current Iraqi prime minister’s graduate dissertation at Salahaddin University in Erbil.

Massoum retains the respect of both the KDP and PUK. He is married and has five daughters.

Salim Abdullah al-Jabouri, Speaker of Parliament
On July 15th, Salim Abdullah al-Jabouri was elected speaker of the Iraq Parliament. The Sunni Arab is a professor of law at Nahrain University in Baghdad but was born and raised in Mugdadiya, Diyala province.

43 year old Salim Abdullah al-Jabouri is the youngest speaker in Iraq’s history. In 2010, al-Jubouri was nominated to parliament and headed the Human Rights Committee. He accused the government of Nouri al Maliki of torturing detainees. Salim Abdullah al-Jabouri is on record as saying he does not support a third term for Premier Nouri al Maliki.

Al-Jabouri has “serious crime cases” pending. In 2014, he was targeted by a roadside bomb, which killed two of his bodyguards.

In the general election of 2014, he was elected in the predominantly Sunni Arab list ‘Diyala Is Our Identity Coalition’ which is part of the wider Muttahidoon party. When al-Jabouri got elected speaker he expressed his belief in dialogue and mutual understanding, when stating in a press release, “that many political powers feel of the urgent need to this dialogue and hopes to reach a solution satisfactory to all parties to achieve the interest of Iraq at the end.”

Wednesday, July 23, 2014

Iraq Conflict Update: 22 July, 2014

In Iraq pressure remains high for the political authorities to form a unity government. General developments in Iraq indicate a stalemate with IS showing both its depth of resources and its limited ability to hold on to further military gains. The failed joint assault by the ISF and Shiite militias on Tikrit underscores their inability to defeat the insurgents.

Salah ad-Din Province
Renewed fighting erupted around the university buildings in Tikrit. IS insurgents were forced to withdraw from Contingency Operating Base Speicher by ISF.

In Al-Dhuluiya clashes continue between IS insurgents and ISF, which are being supported by local tribesmen and air support from the Iraqi Airforce.

The NGO ShiaRightsWatch published a report on the lack of access to water and food in Tuz Khormotu. For more information, click here.

Anbar Province
In Anbar the ISF continues attacks on the northern outskirts of Fallujah. Clashes in Ramadi are ongoing.

Kirkuk Province
IS insurgent attacks on Peshmerga positions at Tal Al-Warid and Mala Abdulla.

Diyala Province
Following shelling and airstrikes targeting their positions, IS has withdrawn from the Al-Adhim area of northern Diyala. Clashes broke out between Peshmerga and insurgents south of Jalawla.

Fighting in Al-Hawuraniya, north of Al-Muqdadiya.

Ninevah Province
Mosul’s Christians are increasingly being targeted by IS who force them to convert and pay taxes as a condition for not being expelled from the city.

An airstrike took place.

The Turkish Consulate building is function as an HQ for IS.

IS withdrew some of its forces from  East Mosul a week ago. IS’s main fighting strength was needed in areas south of Tikrit to fight the IA.

Naqshbandi tribes (loyal to the insurgency) are taking down IS flags and replacing them with their own.

The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria


The NCF's Religious Affairs Advisor has drawn our attention to a remarkable display of solidarity against the allure of ISIS (IS). UK based Imams (Shi'ite and Sunni) have made a public video warning young men not to become drawn into the fantasy of a puritan, Islamic utopia as advocated by ISIS (IS). They are clear that the 10 conditions for a Caliphate are not met by (IS) and therefore the proclamation of a Caliphate in Syria/Iraq is null and void.

Their message can be seen on the below link.

Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq


We have decided to issue a short report on each of the three major Shiite political parties in today’s Iraq, ISCI, Dawa, and the Sadrists. ISCI first:
The Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), formerly known as the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and sometimes just called “Majlis” (meaning “The Council”) is headed by Sayyed Amr al-Hakim. Founded in 1982, it depends upon the support of the country’s Shia community. Despite a strong showing in Iraq’s earlier elections; ISCI did poorly in the 2010 parliamentary election at a time when Nouri Al-Maliki and his Dawa Party were in the ascendancy. ISCI bounced back however and the coalition of which ISCI forms the principal part, the Iraq National Alliance, fared well in the 2014 elections. Today, ISCI remains one of the three major Shiite political parties; the others being the State of Law coalition (of which the Premier’s Dawa Party is the main element), and the Sadrist group. ISCI are paternalist in nature and are the conservative (or if you prefer Republican) party of Iraq Shiite politics. Their preferred candidate for Premier has been Bayan Jabr but he is unlikely to gain cross Shiite political support so they are currently promoting Adel Abdul Mahdi.
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Maliki’s premiership
Maliki does not have ISCI’s backing as the man to deal with the ISIS threat. Spokesman for the Sadrist bloc (currently allied with ISCI), Jawad Al-Jubouri, declared Adel Abdul Mahdi, ISCI member and former Iraq Vice-President, was among the favourites to represent the Shia alliance instead of Maliki, the other name in the frame being Ahmed Chalabi (though no Sadrist himself Chalabi has long been the darling of the Sadrist movement).
Amr al-Hakim says that finding a new Prime Minister “acceptable to the other partners” and “representing the majority” is essential as this is “how we create the rhythm”.
One very senior member of ISCI told the NCF, “Our problem is that Premier Maliki issues statements without consulting any of us. To be honest this actually weakens his position in the Shiite alliance. Though thus far only ISCI and the Sadrists have stood up to Maliki. And time is sensitive. Those close to Maliki are suggesting we can take a couple of months to decide on the premiership but that we should decide who is to be President and Speaker immediately. We don’t want any such postponement because that would be the road to dictatorship.”
International Influence
ISCI does not support Iranian intervention in Iraq. Senior member of ISCI, Ali Al-Moayyed, has declared that Iraq’s citizens are still capable of dealing with the current crisis without outside help. He stated that "given the fatwa issued by the religious authority [Ayatollah Ali Sistani] and presence of millions of Iraqi people on the scene, I don't think there will be any need to the presence of noble Iranians in Iraq's war fronts."
On the ISIS issue, ISCI President Amr al-Hakim said there was a “need to face the severe terrorist attack through unity”, stressing the importance of harmonising domestic, regional and international efforts to fight terrorism so as to deliver a coherent and coordinated response to current threats to the country, the region and the world.
Political Unity and Terrorism
Amr al-Hakim reiterated his belief that Iraq has the “ability to overcome all problems and crises” through the establishment of “partnerships among the key political actors of the country”. He stressed how urgent it was to avoid “mutual accusation of disloyalty” and accused Iraq’s television channels of strengthening sectarian divisions and called on his followers to respect the call for reconciliation delivered by the Iraq’s religious leaders.
He further announced that Iraqis must be ready to make sacrifices if they wish to achieve democracy; “everything has a price that everyone must pay”. He went on to say that those “igniting the flame of terrorism” would eventually be consumed by its fire. He further added that the “impure, intellectually trivial and criminal Takfiri Daesh terrorists (i.e. ISIS)” will soon be forced to retreat.
“Iraqis believe it is their destiny to defend the country, the region, and the world” he continued. He declared that “the conflict today is a conflict of wills, not of politics” and that victory would go to those who were in the right. He further added that those who remain silent about current injustices committed by the terrorists are just as guilty as they are.

Wednesday, July 02, 2014

Jaysh al-Tariqa al-Naqshbandia


The Jaysh Rijal al-Tariqa al-Naqshbandia (JRTN), which is rendered in English as the Army of the Men of the Naqshbandi Order, is a large and prominent Sunni insurgent group in Iraq. JRTN endorses violent strategies and is a nationalist/Ba’athist group rather than a quasi-religious group.

JRTN was established in December 2006 following the execution of Saddam Hussein ostensibly as a reactionary force to protect Naqshbandis from extremists such as Al-Qaeda in Iraq (the predecessor to ISIS from which ISIS evolved). It works closely with and is part of the Baathist “Majlis al Askeri” or General Military Council which meets in Mosul. JRTN is the lead Baathist command and is the second largest military force in the uprising after ISIS (indeed it almost certainly is actually numerically superior to ISIS but ISIS is far better equipped and has far greater financial resources).

The Naqshbandia (i.e. the religious movement rather than the JRTN military force) is a major spiritual order of Sunni Sufism which traces its spiritual lineage to the prophet Muhammad through Abu Bakr, the first Caliph and Muhammad’s companion. There are other Naqshbandia orders that trace their lineage through Ali, Muhammad’s son-in-law and the fourth Caliph. Izzat al-Douri has been a Naqshbandi sheikh since the late 70s.

The JRTN military force has Ba’athist colouring and is also led by Saddam’s former deputy, Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri, the last surviving plotter of those who brought the Ba’ath party to power in the 1968 Iraq coup (and the man elected to the leadership of the Iraqi Ba’ath after the execution of Saddam). It is unclear as to what extent al-Douri has a role in the day-to-day running of the group. He has rarely been seen since the 2003 invasion though a video surfaced in 2012 showing him to be alive. There are reports that he requires regular dialysis and if these reports are true, as is likely, al-Douri is more of an insurgent figurehead than an operational leader.

Al-Douri’s authority and history as a member of the Ba’ath party leadership has been important in driving up recruitment numbers among Sunnis. He is a regarded as a veteran networker and coalition builder, with extensive contacts. Izzat al-Douri has up till recently been outside Iraq fundraising for the insurgency and for its monthly magazine publicising the group’s operations and promoting its ideology through which it solicits donations. He is in Iraq now. According to local sources, al-Douri visited the Mosul governorate headquarters of JRTN on 12th June in the immediate aftermath of the fall of Mosul prior to which he was hiding in a “country in the region” (presumed by many to be Qatar).

The group operates in Baghdad, al-Anbar, Ninaweh, Diyala and Salah al-Din provinces. JRTN utilises guerrilla tactics that include attacking soft targets first to minimise its own casualties. The group uses a two-pronged strategy which has a so called “defensive phase” which involves attacks from a distance, typically with missiles, followed by an assault phase.

Role played in the 2014 Iraq Conflict
The JRTN played a significant role in the capture of Mosul earlier this month. The JRTN took responsibility for “liberating” the five bridges that connect the western and eastern parts of Mosul. They have assumed an increasingly commanding role in the administration of the insurgent occupied cities. Some of their generals have been proclaimed “governors” of captured cities. For instance Ahmed Abdul Rashid has been appointed the governor to Tikrit.

JRTN has been increasingly prominent in this anti-government insurgency taking an active part in what are known as the Tribal Military Councils since the commencement of the Anbar crisis in January 2014.

There are three or four strands to the insurgency:

1.      The smaller Islamist groups like Jaish Ansar al Sunnah
2.      The neo-Baathists of the General Military Council, foremost among which are the JRTN. Sunnis who want to restore a Saddam-style dictatorship but don’t share ISIS’s hard-line interpretation of Islam.
3.      The tribal groups.
4.      ISIS, the strike force spearheading much of the combat.

JRTN is very well organised, but they’re not as large as ISIS and they don’t have the financial resources that ISIS do.

It might seem that ISIS and the JRTN will sooner or later have a fall out. At a local level there was a minor squabble that resulted in some infighting over the spoils of war but by and large the two theoretically diametrically opposed forces have coexisted on the age old formula of “my enemy’s enemy is my friend”. Ever since 2003, when the Ansar al-Islam group, the Kurdish Islamists thrown out of Halabja by US Special Forces, took refuge in Mosul, Islamist and Baathist groups have coexisted.

The story of how ISIS evolved is convoluted and perhaps appropriate for a separate report; but sufficient to say that after 9/11 2001 these Islamist groups gradually grew stronger and they ended up headquartered in Mosul from 2003 on - along with the former Baathists – and these groups have a history of working closely, very closely, together, despite their totally incompatible ideologies. Having said which, ISIS holds a very specific and particular view of Islam, which is not compatible with the views of the JRTN (a group which only has a nominal quasi-Sufi affiliation). In any case, both Sufism and Baathism stand in stark contrast with Salafism (Islamic Puritanism) and Takfirism (the rejection of those who do not share your beliefs as heretics). Both groups currently push their religious differences aside to unite against their common enemy. However, any such Sufi-Salafi alliance is unlikely to survive in the absence of a common enemy, and in time may provoke a new and bitter conflict in strife-torn Iraq. ISIS wants to create an Islamic Caliphate whilst JRTN want to restore Baathist rule. These differences are not going to go away anytime soon.

Furthermore, JRTN was opposed to AQI (led by Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi who leads ISIS today) when the group was first founded in 2006. This past conflict between JRTN and AQI suggests that there would be tensions between the JRTN and ISIS leadership. In May 31, there were clashes between the JRTN and ISIS, which took place in Salah ad-Din (admittedly between local militia men over who would take home captured oil tankers) and recently there have been clashes in Hawija, near Kirkuk, between the two groups. Other clashes have taken place, including in Mosul itself, which are often reported as having been over ideology, but the sordid truth is that these are invariably squabbles over money at a local level.

The Naqshbandi Sufi movement from which JRTN takes its name has a formulaic spiritual code which involves watchfulness, solitude, contemplation and restraint.
 

Monday, June 30, 2014

The Feasibility of a Confederal Iraq


In this second report on current developments in Iraq, we look at the aspiration for “confederalism” rather than mere federalism that various members of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) have been giving voice to since the outbreak of the present troubles. One KRG representative spoke directly to the NCF during an MESC meeting a couple of days ago and stated, “Kurds participated in the writing of the Iraqi constitution. Federalism was the chosen political structure, as stated in the constitution, but it was never implemented. We cannot go back to the pre-ISIS situation. There must now be a move from federalism to confederalism.” However there is clear blue water between the concept of a “federal” Iraq and that of a “confederal” Iraq and the difference represented by the new Kurdish position should be understood. There are few truly confederal nations in the world today. Switzerland is a “soft” confederation as is Belgium. There is a sense in which the Gulf Cooperation Council states or the European Union are “confederations”. The following short report by NCF interns is an attempt to clarify the implications of the new position being advocated by the KRG.
The feasibility of a confederal Iraq
“The only hope to keep the country together is probably through three different regions with a confederation”      Kirkuk provincial governor Najm al-Din Karim speaking on 25 June 2014
A confederation is an association of states and groups that are loosely bound by a treaty. Most importantly these constituent states retain their national sovereignty and consequently their right to secession.
In some models a constituent state in a confederation will be able to pursue an independent foreign policy (eg. negotiating treaties with other countries); whereas under a federal system the central government would have laws and regulations that supersede those of a constituent state.
In multi-ethnic Iraq, a confederal Iraq could be divided into three large states, reminiscent of the way there were once three distinct Ottoman provinces (Mosul, Baghdad and Basra Vilayets). The new confederal states envisioned would each have one of the three main ethnic groups of Iraq as its majority population: A Kurdish majority state with borders similar to the present borders of Iraqi Kurdistan, a Sunni majority state and a Shia majority state.  
One way of interpreting Iraq’s move to a “confederal” system would be a transition to the “new” type of confederation pioneered by the European Union. An EU-style confederation would result in a stark transfer of powers to the different member states. Regional parliaments would have almost complete control over their own state and could pursue an independent foreign policy. There would still be a “national” parliament for the whole of Iraq, which could direct common economic policies with numerous common laws facilitating a single economic market within Iraq with open internal borders, and a common currency along with other key aspects found within the EU confederal system. However, this national parliament would be largely toothless in dictating the budget and public finances of the sovereign regions.
The least radical approach would be the Belgian form of quasi-confederalism.  An Iraqi state modelled on Belgium would not include the right of secession for the various regional groups but would ensure significant powers were transferred from Baghdad to the regional capitals. This would be similar to the Iraq that US Senator Joe Biden called for in 2006, an Iraq where “the Kurdish, Sunni and Shiite regions would each be responsible for their own domestic laws, administration and internal security, the central government would control border defense, foreign affairs and oil revenues.”
Whilst some would welcome a looser Iraq under a confederal system in the hopes of de-escalating sectarian tensions, others have warned against it. Iraqi scholar, Sami Ramadani, stated that "those who claim [Iraq] could only have peace if it is divided into three states do not appreciate the makeup of Iraqi society; the three regions would quickly fall under the rule of violent sectarians and chauvinists. Given how ethnically and religiously varied Iraq's regions are, particularly in Baghdad and central Iraq, a three-way national breakup would be a recipe for permanent wars in which only the oil companies, the arms suppliers and the warlords will be the winners".

Monday, June 16, 2014

Why Iraq should consider separate Sunni and Shia regions: Article for The Guardian by Ranj Alaaldin



Below is the article for The Guardian, 13th June 2014 by Ranj Alaaldin
Why Iraq should consider separate Sunni and Shia regions

The seizing of Mosul, Iraq's second largest city, by jihadists has sent shockwaves throughout the Middle East and the rest of the world. TheIslamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Isis), now controls or operates with impunity in territory stretching between Syria and Iraq, and will attempt to push to the south, take control of Baghdad and effectively put an end to Iraq as we know it.

But Iraq can still be saved. In the short-term the country, with the support of either regional powers such as Iran and Turkey or the broader international community, must hit back fast and hard at the Sunni north.

The Iraqis have already asked the US for air strikes. That could go a long way. It is imperative the government reassures the Iraqi people that Isis is no match for it; that Isis is not a force for the future, lest it swells its ranks with more Iraqis and expands its support bases. It must be given a bloody nose.

The military option in the short-term might empower and give moderate Sunni Arab forces a chance in the longer run, but for this to happen – and for Iraq to sustain itself – the country must accept that the notion of a centralised and unified Iraq has been a failed exercise.

The problem is essentially one of authority. The Iraqi state and its armed forces are seen as being Shia controlled, and therefore lack respect and recognition in the Sunni north. It is no coincidence that Iraq's most stable areas are those that are most homogeneous, where security and governance is in the hands of local actors seen as legitimate by a supportive local population, as in the case of the Kurdish north and the Shia south.

As the Americans did, the government has tried to rely on local tribes to stabilise Sunni Arab areas. However, they are seen as government proxies. During the course of conflict in the north, particularly in Anbar, most switched sides to fight against the state.

This week in Mosul, Iraq's Arab Sunnis effectively welcome Isis with open arms because of a sense of fear as well as widespread agitations toward the Shia-dominated government in Baghdad. The continued rejection of the post-2003 Iraq by Arab Sunnis has given Isis the chance to capitalise, with maximum effect, on feelings of marginalisation among the Sunni Arab community.

Giving moderate Sunni Arab leaders the chance to self-govern within an autonomous region, if and when extremists elements such as Isis have been contained, constitutes a realistic way forward that accepts the Shia-dominated Baghdad government lacks the legitimacy and support to challenge militants for the hearts and minds of Sunni Arabs.

Regionalising Iraq into different ethno-sectarian regions has been proposed in the past. It can no longer be dismissed. Sectarian conflict is no longer identified simply as a problem that came and left with the Americans, but as an Iraqi problem that will dominate Iraq for decades to come.

Further, moderate Sunni Arab actors now welcome the idea of an autonomous region, accepting that they miscalculated when mobilising their communities to reject the new Iraq in 2003. They now hold prestigious government posts, accept the new Iraq is here to stay, and regret that it was their mobilisation of Sunnis that allowed extremists to rise.

The Kurds have proved that autonomy is not synonymous with partition. It is ironic that the Kurds, long derided by their Arab partners for making the most of their autonomy and weakening Iraq, are now its most unifying force.

The Kurdish peshmerga forces are Iraq's most organised, effective and disciplined military force and have deployed heavily in areas that separate Iraqi Kurdistan from Arab Iraqi areas currently controlled by Isis. In Syria's north-east, the Kurds have fought Isis and other Islamists with great effect and have proved they have the capacity to contain and eliminate them.

If Isis becomes too much of a threat, then the Kurds will act to protect their own population and territory. But the Kurds will not save Iraq at the expense of Kurdish interests. They suffered heavily in the past in the hands of either dictatorial or Sunni Islamist entities, and will look to avoid being dragged into a conflict that is not yet theirs to fight.

Therefore, unless Kurdistan's interests are threatened, a Kurdish intervention can take place only if the Kurds' Arab partners guarantee Kurdistan's interests in Iraq. That means giving the Kurds increased autonomy, energy rights and control over oil-rich disputed territories like Kirkuk. But the Kurds may now get all that anyway.

Control of Kirkuk takes the Kurds all the more closer to independence. The Kurds have also proved their worth by taking in more than 700,000 displaced Iraqis from Mosul. The question and litmus test for them is whether their Arab partners are ready to reciprocate.

The Price of Failure: An article by Sam Morris for RUDAW



Below is the text from Samuel's article for RUDAW, 14th June 2014.

The Price of Failure


The situation in Iraq is currently in a constant state of flux. Mosul has fallen into the hands of the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS) and large parts of the country are out of government control. With Iraq’s second city lost and the spread continuing, the coming days and weeks will define the country’s future. ISIS have made staggering gains, defeating an army that is many times its size. While predictions may be difficult,it is not hard to predict that this will be a difficult period for not only Iraq, but the region as a whole.The questions to be raised now are: Can Iraq be brought back from the brink? And how did it get this bad?


It can be argued that the Sunni insurgency never really left Iraq,The Government of Iraq has never managed to deal effectively with the Sunni Arab sense of disempowerment and consequent discontent following the fall of Saddam. However real blame for the empowerment of Sunni extremists has to be laid at the door of Premier Al Maliki.


Al Maliki’s decision, in December 2013, to tear down protest camps in Anbar while targeting ISIS camps in Wadi Horan, near the Iraqi-Syria border, really started the ball rolling. A power vacuum was created in Anbar against a backdrop of growing discontent in the general population and a feeling of marginalisation and disenfranchisement. ISIS capitalized. They fought hard for the cities of Fallujah and Ramadi.


In the run up to the elections Maliki managed to use the situation in Anbar to his advantage. War-time presidents do well and Maliki did better than many expected. Had people known what the situation would be like just a few months later things would not have been the same. With vast areas of Iraq in the hands of ISIS, Maliki has lost control.


To let Iraq’s second city fall was a major military failure.A huge underestimation of ISIS. This was combined by the lack of awareness of the low morale in the army. Many soldiers have been fighting in Anbar for the last year, watching their brothers in arms die around them.Whilst soldiers in provinces like Mosul may be drawn from all communities, including some who are Sunni Arab, senior officers tend to be predominantly Shiite, with a few from key loyal minority groups. The consequence in Mosul was that the officers were those that felt most vulnerable and decided to run first. After only a few days of fighting Mosul was lost, getting it back will be hugely difficult if not impossible, if left to Maliki.


Getting closer and closer through the areas of Salahaddin, Anbar and Diyala, Baghdad will be partially surrounded. Maliki has lost the support of his army. The country is out of control and currentlyMaliki has no ability to fight back.


Strengthened by their success in Syria and Anbar, ISIS have made a clear decision to push in Iraq in an attempt to bring the country to its knees. ISIS managed to consolidate its strength in Syria. Carving out areas of influence and control, fighting more with other opposition groups than with the government.ISIS have a core aim, the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate. The organisation has been merciless in this regard.


Fighting with other groups in Syria for power. Power, influence and access to resources is of huge importance to ISIS. Claiming Al-Raqqa as its capital in 2013, many ISIS supporters believe that the dream of establishing an Islamic caliphate across the borders of Iraq and Syria may be near.If the situation continues as it is,it will.


There has been a clear strategy by ISIS.Stepping up operations over the last 6 months.Now at its crescendo, ISIS appears to be surging south to Baghdad. Capitalising on Maliki’s weak position, the low morale in the Iraqi Army, and their own brutal reputation, ISIS have been ruthlessly effective. Bolstered by support, the prominence of the uprising in Syria both regionally and internationally has encouraged elements of the Sunni minority in Iraq to fight against Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.


Fuelled by their successes and gains, geographically, militarily and economically, ISIS will be strengthened by its advances. Rising out of the ashes of the Islamic State of Iraq, ISIS may change the dynamics in the Middle East.


Both the United Kingdom and the United States have had a policy of disengagement with Iraq since they have pulled out. Their focus put on other foreign policy issues and their own internal problems. The support for an active policy in Iraq has not been there.


This has been a major failure. Iraq was and remains of huge strategic importance to Western nations and its complete implosion will prove negative for all involved, except for those waving the black flags of extreme Islamist groups. International engagement was hugely important for Iraq to maintain its borders and security with a brutal civil war taking place next door in Syria.


Iraq never stopped being an important strategic partner for the West. Not only economically but also, now ironically, from a counter-extremism and radicalisation perspective. The impact of radicalisation in Syria has become the key security issue for Western states, however the West’s lack of foresight will now see Iraq join Syria as a hotbed for radicalisation. As the situation in the region degraded, Western governments should have recognised the importance of Iraq however unpalatable this may have been to western politicians. Now without significant foreign intervention Iraq may be lost.


The US government should act now. Support should be given to both Iraq and the Kurdistan Region. The flow of ISIS through Iraq has been fast. To stem the tide the West should act. Boots on the ground is impossible. Strategic targets should be identified and the flow weapons and military vehicles into Syrianeeds to be stopped. This combined with direct military support may be the only options left if Iraq if is to survive.


Maliki has few options. Either, surge forward, attempting to gain lost ground, in what will be a bloody venture and a hard fight to get parts of Mosul under control. An option that may be impossible. This is not Saulat Al-Fursan. The other option is to consolidate his forces and defend Baghdad and the south. The second, will be effectively conceding half of the country. Iraq will, de-facto, be split. A situation of a long term war of attrition as we are witnessing in Syria is possible.



What comes next will be important but what is clear now, is that Maliki has failed. Through neglecting the situation in Anbar, with failed attempts to bring an end to a situation he created, Maliki has underestimated the force and desire of ISIS. As Iraq Army losses continue, it becomes apparent that many are unwilling to fight under his command.


What has become clear is that 2014 is an important year in the long history of Iraq.

IRAQ: Of Dreams and Nightmares

Blog from Jonathan Mueller - Former U.S. State Department diplomat

On 19 December 1944 Eisenhower convened a commanders' conference to consider how to respond the the Ardennes Offensive the Germans had launched three days before.  All was doom and gloom until George Pattoon took the floor.  He said, 'The Kraut has stuck his head into a meat-grinder and my hand is on the crank.'  

Patton had recognised that the German breakthrough was an opportunity as well as a threat.  

Likewise, when ISIS advanced from Mosul on Baghdad, they stuck their heads into a meat-grinder, with the Kurds' hands on the crank.  

The difference is that, while Patton was determined to turn that crank, it is not clear what the Kurds will do.  After all, what reason has Nuri al-Maliki given them to pull his chestnuts from the fire?  So the Peshmerga has occupied Kirkuk and other disputed areas around the margins of the KAR, but made no offensive move against ISIS.  They have even stopped short of an attempt to take Mosul, probably calculating that it is too big, with too many different factions, some of whom would welcome them, but others of whom would not.

The last, best hope, though, for preserving a united Iraq, though, is a Kurd-Shia alliance.  But even at this juncture, Maliki, despite having his back against the wall, is not reading the handwriting on it.  Divisively sectarian to the last, he is still looking for a Shia solution, and at last report had not even spoken to Barzani since the fall of Mosul.   

That Shia solution, a people's army of Shia militia fighters, is likely to defend Baghdad and the Shia south, but is unlikely to regain significant Sunni territory, and still less likely to pacify any territory it does regain.  So as things are unfolding, the Peshmerga sit in Kirkuk, the Shia hold Baghdad, and, e voila, Iraq is partitioned.  

If the U.S. still wishes a united Iraq, the best thing it can do now is provide logistical and tactical air support for a Peshmerga raid aimed at taking ISIS forces advancing on Baghdad in the rear.  One swift stroke to destroy or disperse ISIS forces, and withdraw -- any attempt by the Kurds to hold Sunni territory would end in disaster.  

This would require the U.S. and Maliki to concede more to the Kurds than they wish, but probably no more than the Kurds will take in the course of current trends.  

The Iraqi army is a corpse, and any plan based on them will fail.  By 2011, the Americans could just about claim to have built an army for Iraq, but since then, reduced training, flourishing corruption, and promotions and command assignments based on sectarian loyalties instead of professional competence, it has been all downhill.  Soldiers enlist because it is better than being unemployed, and with no training, no leadership, and a nightmare trying to maintain the sophisticated weapons the Americans gave them (the beauty of the Peshmerga's old Soviet tanks is that they can be maintained in the shade tree garage; not so the Iraqi army's M-1s), what do you expect?  It is really just the Job Corps in HUMMVEEs.  

The KRG position appears to be that if Baghdad cannot provide security it should not claim sovereignty.  The Kurds have come a long since 1991, when friends who dealt with them in Operation Provide Comfort found them a frustratingly quarrelsome gang of mountain-men.  They have used the autonomy they have had to learn to conduct their own politics and order their own affairs.  Now they stand at a historic moment, on the threshold of their dream of an independent state.  When one compares the KAR to the rest of Iraq, I am not too sure I see a reason to fear that.  

ISIS, on the other had, will not be a big winner in the end,  It is only the most notorious of a number of Sunni factions who currently cooperate out of hatred for the Maliki government, but which will, in due course, turn on each other, and I expect we shall then see that ISIS does not represent the aspirations of a majority of Iraqi Sunnis.

Thursday, February 06, 2014

Al-Hashemi comments on Anbar

Interviewed by Reuters fugitive Iraqi former Vice President Tarek Al-Hashemi accused Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki, a Shiite, of conducting a political witch-hunt against Sunni politicians and persecuting Iraq’s Sunni population. Al-Hashemi fears that the current conflict in Anbar, which borders Syria, could spread to other regions, and blames the Prime Minister’s treatment of Sunnis. In his own words:

“I’m not optimistic about the future… I think this spark in Anbar will spread to other provinces… Al-Maliki is targeting Arab Sunnis (in Iraq) in different provinces, with the use of army forces, or handing them death sentences in a way that has never been seen in Iraq’s modern history, and therefore it’s the right of these individuals to defend themselves in every way possible.”

Hashemi, who has not lived in Iraq since a warrant was issued for his arrest, for running death squads, in 2011, said that it would be ‘disastrous’ if Maliki won a third term in Parliamentary elections set for April 30th. Hashemi’s comments come in the wake of violent conflict in Anbar, notably Fallujah, and the arrest of prominent lawmaker and anti-Maliki Sunni Ahmed Al-Alwani, taken from his home in the same province. This is the latest high profile Sunni arrest. In 2012 it was former finance minister Raffi el-Essawi. Many Sunnis believe Maliki is marginalizing the Sunni population. They complain that federal forces have been disproportionally deployed in Sunni neighbourhoods, random arrests have increased, and Sunnis feel left out of the decision making process.

Many Sunnis, some of whom fought with the US and government forces against al-Qaeda insurgents in 2008, are finding themselves caught up in a three-way conflict between the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), the government, and tribal militias. The solution to the problem, as many see it, is for Maliki to radically alter his approach to Sunni opposition. Up until now he has responded to Sunni protest and dissatisfaction with military force. Maliki must start to include Sunnis in the political process and reach out to the community to heal the wounds of the last few years.

Monday, February 03, 2014

Exclusive NCF Interview with Dr. Akram Al-Obaidy

In an interview with the Next Century Foundation, Dr. Akram Al-Obaidy, Spokesman of the Speaker of the Iraqi Council of Representatives, outlined his future hopes for Kirkuk and its position within Iraq at this present time. With a round of parliamentary elections due in April 2014, Dr. Al-Obaidy was keen to present them as a crucial moment for the future development and prosperity of Kirkuk.

After 10 years of what he described as an “unsuitable” situation in Kirkuk with “very little communication between Arabs, Kurds and Turkmen”, Dr. Al-Obaidy has called for a strengthening of links between the three groups.

Indeed, he cites Mosul as an example of how communication between the various ethnic groups “free from any interference from Baghdad” has provided the foundations for rising levels of peace and promising infrastructural development. Moreover, Dr. Al-Obaidy states that, “any desire for Baghdad to involve themselves in Kirkuk would be unwise due to the problems surrounding the Central Government at the moment, particularly with the recent dramatic rise in sectarian violence and bloodshed across Iraq”. Additionally, he fears that, “any interference could see Kirkuk being drawn into this wider Iraqi sectarian agenda, losing sight and focus of what needs to be done in Kirkuk alone”.

Once effective communication is established between Arabs, Kurds and Turkmen in Kirkuk, Dr. Al-Obaidy notes that discussions must be had on the following issues: power-sharing, security, a fair and equal distribution of wealth, revenue and supplies and above all, more representation and attention towards the under-developed Arab areas of Kirkuk.

Therefore, the forthcoming Parliamentary Elections are being highlighted by Dr. Akram Al-Obaidy as an important opportunity for potentially the next decade in Kirkuk. Dr. Al-Obaidy believes his Motahadon party, which acts in coalition with other Arabic parties under the umbrella of the Arabic Kirkuk Alliance (a group of 12 parties and 24 candidates), represents a new breed of politicians that can “finally bring true and fair Arab representation to politics in Kirkuk”. He claims that Arab representation has often lagged in contrast to Kurd and Turkman in the region.

Dr. Al-Obaidy is optimistic that the contingent of the 875,000 voting population in Kirkuk can produce as many as four winning MPs in the upcoming elections. Al-Obaidy’s parties will also be putting forward a number of female candidates, with the hope of at least one being successful. The elections see a total of 12 seats available in Kirkuk with one additional seat exclusively given to a Christian candidate.

Saturday, January 18, 2014

America is heading for the hills

Fighting is escalating between Iraqi security forces and al Qaeda linked militants in the Sunni dominated Anbar province of Iraq. According to the news reports, on 17th of January, a suicide bomber attacked a gathering of anti Al Qaeda militia, which resulted in death of at least five people. The attack took place on the second week of sporadic clashes erupted between Iraqi forces and al Qaeda backed militants to recapture the key two cities, Fallujah and Ramadi, which have been under the control of militants.
The UN General Secretary Ban Ki Moon urged both parties to act with constraint and pursue a political solution. Yet, the Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki ruled out any dialogue with the militants. According to the UN, since the beginning of the conflict, more than 11,000 families have fled their houses.
The US State Department spokeswoman Marie Harf dismissed allegations that the US has turned its back on Iraq following its withdrawal from the war-torn country in 2011 and suggested that even though at the end of the day, they could help the Iraqi forces in fighting the `terrorists`, they would also want to enhance the capacity of Iraqi security forces to do it themselves.  America is heading for the hills.

Monday, January 06, 2014

Siege in Fallujah



The jihadist group the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) have claimed they control the city of Fallujah in the volatile province of Anbar. Residents are leaving the city, avoiding the air strikes that have already begun to fall in some areas. Fallujah is known in the West as the sight of the deadliest battle of the Iraq War in 2004. Currently ISIL, tribal leaders, and government forces wrestle for control. Anbar, in the West of Iraq, has a largely Sunni population that feels marginalised and under threat from Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s Shiite-dominated government. Iraq’s Sunni population see Maliki’s administration as authoritarian and discriminatory, and they are worried by the examples of violent response to protests. This most recent surge in violence seems to have begun when government troops forcibly broke up a yearlong peaceful protest in Ramadi.

The first five days of 2014 have seen 250 deaths in Anbar province, more than the death toll for the entire month of January last year. This is a continuation of the violence that resulted, according to the UN, in at least 7,818 civilian deaths, and 1,050 deaths amongst the security forces in 2013, the highest in five years. Despite Maliki’s calls for locals to expel the fundamentalists; this death toll is likely to continue to rise as the government prepares to retake Fallujah, Ramadi and Tarmiya from ISIL with military support from both the US and Iran.