These
personal notes represent the views of the NCF’s Secretary General. They should
not be taken as an NCF position but have been compiled using the resources of
the NCF team.
The spreading conflict: Challenges to Iraq
The Syrian conflict has
always threatened to engulf the neighbouring countries. Its impact on Turkey,
Lebanon and Jordan has been considerable. Now Iraq is being affected. It begs
the question: how stable is Iraq and can it withstand the turmoil across its
border? But the thing is you can’t just look at Iraq to get a good overview of
the situation. You need to examine the whole region. So we’ll start with the
big boy:
Turkey
The Turks are negotiating
with the Kurdish PKK. Now why? You know how bad relationships have been between
the Turkish government and the PKK[1]
– or like me do you forget things? There have been so very many terrorist
attacks in Turkey. And if you take the long view over a thirty year period then
40,000 have died in the conflict between the Turkish government and the Kurdish
militants (mostly during that huge operation to restore government control of
South East Turkey in the late 80s and early 90s).
So I’ll answer my own
question. Turkish Premier Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has messed up on
Syria. His Syrian policy has already prompted some Turks to express concern. But
the Syria issue is not at the heart of the “what is the Turkish motive” question.
In the 2011 elections, Erdoğan’s
AK party (which has links with the Muslim Brotherhood[2]) won
power again but the problem is that Erdoğan, Turkey’s most successful
politician since Ataturk, wants to retain power. Now Turkey has a powerful
Premier and less powerful President. But it wasn’t always that way. Once upon a
time the President was powerful[3].
Erdoğan’s plan is to restore the power of the Presidency and to take the post
himself.
Erdoğan is not worried that AKP will lose
popularity as a result of Syria – it might have an effect in the provinces
adjacent to the Syrian frontier, but we doubt whether it would have a serious
electoral impact elsewhere. There is no
serious alternative party around to challenge AKP.
Erdoğan’s problem is a personal one: the AKP has a couple of party rules which are
unique to it – the other parties do not have them. One states that an individual cannot be
adopted by the party as a parliamentary candidate more than three consecutive
times. The other says you cannot run for
party leader more than three consecutive times.
Erdoğan is thus
now in his last parliamentary term and stint as party leader. Rules of course can be changed, but he has
made a big thing about AKP being different from other parties, and he has
repeatedly stated that he will not be standing again. Thus the only serious option for him to have
a political future is to become President.
The election will be next year – and
for the first time (as a result of a 2007 constitutional change) the President
will be directly elected by the people. Erdoğan is most unlikely to
face any serious competitor unless the political elements underpinning the
ruling party fragment in some way. There
is general agreement between the parties about the need for a new constitution –
but not about what that constitution should contain. The AKP wants to introduce a presidential
system (thus of course reducing the competence of parliament) – the other
parties don’t. However, Erdoğan might get the support of the Kurdish BDP[4] (Barış ve
Demokrasi Partisi = Peace and Democracy Party) for a new draft constitution
which could be submitted to referendum.
That is the motive (for the ruling party) in pushing the PKK
agreement. Of course, if the Kurdish
question is “solved”, he would reap a considerable reward, both domestically in
terms of votes and internationally in terms of prestige, which is perhaps
another motive.
Oh and by the way – that
being the case there is little or no prospect of any Turkish invasion of Syria.
As we move deeper into this winter of discontent, civilian casualty figures finally show signs of decreasing, while government and rebel figures have stabilized (the NCF carefully compiles and assesses death tolls from all available sources – we regard our figures as closer to an approximation of the real position than those of any other single source – especially if used to indicate trends). The steady emptying of the cities and countryside as the people flee the fighting to take refuge in neighbouring states accounts, in part, for the lower civilian death toll. Those displaced have expressed great anger at the negligence of the Arab world and the international community for not acting. Over 700,000 refugees continue to live in dire conditions in refugee camps. If, as seems likely, present trends continue, these numbers will reach over 1.1 million before the summer.
Meanwhile Moaz al-Khatib, the leader of the Western
backed National Coalition faction of the Syrian Opposition, stated he was
willing to hold direct talks with the Syrian Government. This came following
talks with Russian and Iranian foreign ministers on 2 February 2013. However,
some of his supporters from the Syrian National Council reacted
negatively, rejecting any negotiations with the Syrian government whilst other
more secular groups not in the National Coalition said they favoured
talks which, in common with Moaz al-Khatib, they argued could halt
the killings and destruction.
The US has remained staunch in its stand
regarding the situation in Syria. Although the Obama administration has called
for President Assad to step down, they claim a direct military intervention
would trigger more violence and this could lead to greater chaos and carnage.
According to UN-Arab League envoy Lakhdar Brahimi, Syria is being destroyed
“bit by bit” and “unprecedented levels of horror have been reached”. He urged
the UN Security Council to overcome their differences and “grapple with this
problem now”.
Russia remains in the lead on Syria
and everyone is heading for Moscow in droves. The opposition is having a hard
time and has started the usual rumour mill. They’re spreading around the rumour
that Maher, the President’s brother, is dead. According to them he died in
Moscow having been flown there for treatment after being severely wounded in
the legs. This is quite untrue – Maher is alive. Then they have also been
saying the President’s mother and sister fled to Abu Dhabi. They certainly went
there to visit and it is unclear whether they are back home yet.
The main point is that Syria is on the
road to an interim salvation government prior to Bashar stepping down in May
2014 and everyone is invited to the ‘negotiate the future’ party. Even the
Iranians have agreed. Therefore it is important to watch what Sayed Jalili has
to say. He is Iran’s National Security boss and says that, “On Syria we support
national dialogue and say no to violence but yes to democracy”.
Everyone’s focus now is on who will
replace Bashar as the new ruler of Syria. They need and will have a
non-Salafist. That’s an absolute red line for the USA, Russia and Iran. Beyond
that they don’t care too much.
Names in the frame include some of
the old guard. An older person is viewed as acceptable because at least he or
she is a known quantity. By way of example: The communist Turkman, Abdulrazak
Eid, is a name that has cropped up. He’s a 62 year old writer and reformer.
Another possibility is Michelle Kilo, the 72 year old Christian intellectual
and human rights activist. But it’s anybody’s guess really and there are a
number of possibilities. There is a danger too that naming people too soon ‘burns
their credibility’, so we will not try to compile an accurate list of
frontrunners.
Saudi
Arabia
The Saudis have generally
dug their heels in. Their conflict with Qatar has reached new heights since they
stomped on the Qatar-Bahrain causeway plan. We can but hope that they are
stepping back from their policy of backing the Salafists.
At least there is a new team at the top of the Saudi Government which seems like it could potentially be much more progressive in responding to some of the critical issues facing the region, including Syria and Bahrain.
Crown Prince Nayef bin Abdul-Aziz al Saud, next in line to the Saudi throne, died in Switzerland following an illness on the 16th of June 2012. He had been Deputy Prime Minister and was the long-standing (since 1975) and hardline Interior Minister. Nayef was the most conservative of the leading Saudi princes, and with his son, Muhammad bin Nayef at his side as his deputy, spearheaded the country's post-September 11 crackdown on al-Qaeda.
Nayef’s younger brother, Prince Salman, became Crown Prince after being the Minister of Defence since the death of his full brother Sultan and the governor of Riyadh for nearly five decades.
Now, Prince Muqrin bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, former head of the Saudi intelligence and Governor of Madina and Hail and the youngest son of the kingdom's founder Abd al-Aziz bin Abd al-Rahman Al Saud, has been recently named the country's second deputy prime minister by King Abdullah. The announcement places Muqrin third in line to the throne and at the top of the kingdom's power structure.
Michael Stephens, an analyst at the Doha-based Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) think-tank, described the move as “buying time for the next generation" -- especially as the first Deputy Prime Minister and second in line to the throne, 77-year-old Prince Salman, is reported to be in ill health.
Stephens further noted that it is anticipated that Muqrin will “continue Abdullah's policy of slow and cautious change and ensure that his legacy as a moderniser is secure”.
With Prince Muqrin ascending to third-in-line to the throne and with competent second generation princes, Muhammad bin Nayef and Khalid bin Bandar, now in key decision-making positions as the Minister of Interior and Governor of Riyadh respectively, it is hoped that the wise King Abdullah has put into place a government strong enough to withstand the serious challenges which are currently buffeting both the region and the kingdom itself.
Iraq
Iraq is really the worry.
The Syrian uprising has been spreading. There has been trouble in the provinces
of Anbar, Salaheddine, and Nineveh. Largely this has been in the nature
of demonstrations, very well organised demonstrations, promoted by the Baathist
/ Islamist alliance. And they are getting out of hand. This in an Iraq which is
already riven with tensions.
Many Iraqis used to blame Saudi Arabia and Qatar for their problems. Not so today. Today the Saudis are sending positive signals to the Iraq government and vice versa (an Iraqi delegation paid its respects in Riyadh on 16 February on the occasion of the death of Prince Sattam bin Abd al-Aziz.
Today, rightly or wrongly, Turkey and Qatar are viewed as the problem nations, though of course the suicide bombers are still largely young Saudis. “The Qataris are paying money for the Saudis to kill themselves,” one Iraqi told me.
But the demonstrations keep coming.
The grievances are expressed clearly. They want less “debaathification” by which they mean the policy by which people
are kept out of politics, even out of employment in certain circumstances if
they were ever senior members of Saddam Hussein’s Baath party, for instance as
university professors. The trouble is that some people (around about 4,000
Iraqis) were senior members of Saddam Hussein’s Baath Party. When the liberation
of Iraq was on the cards the American State Department had an idea of starting
a Truth and Reconciliation committee for Iraq as was done in South Africa, but
the US Defense Department stomped on the notion. Such a shame.
Less debaathification is one demand.
Another is the release of prisoners. Another is the rescinding of article four
on the anti-terrorist legislation which is one of the more widely used articles
in the judicial system and says, basically, that life
imprisonment is the punishment for “anyone who intentionally covers
up any terrorist act or harbors a terrorist with the purpose
of concealment.” Sunnis see this law as disproportionately targeting them and the
controversial Speaker of Iraq’s parliament, Osama Najefi, has said it would be
rescinded.
Iraq’s Deputy Premier
Hussein al-Sharistani is negotiating with the demonstrators. But the problem is
that some of them are very radical, wanting the removal of all debaathification
laws and the release of all prisoners (whatever their crime), indeed some of
the demands border on the ridiculous and perhaps are deliberately couched in
terms that can never be satisfied.
The view in Iraq is
sanguine. Many members of the government think that the West is promoting
Salafism in unrelenting fashion. Meanwhile Iraq has to face provincial
elections on April 20th of this year. Well let me re-phrase that.
Most of Iraq will face elections. The Kurdish region will not as they refuse to
have them. They are frightened that the traditional parties (Barzani’s KDP and
Talabani’s PUK) will do less well. Indeed there is a danger that Talabani’s PUK
have grown so unpopular they will be wiped out. The thing about these elections
is that they are an indication of what may happen in the January 2014
parliamentary elections. They need to go well and against a backdrop of
increasingly aggressive sectarian demonstrations that will not be easy.
In other respects things
are better in Iraq with one big caveat. The infrastructure law has not been
passed which would allow major projects, like port building, to get moved
forward. This is because parliament is not functioning. If they meet, the MPs
just fight, by which I mean they thump each other. Malaki’s Dawa could force it
through with the cooperation of the Kurdish bloc but the Kurds are demanding
17% of the money and the money is $70 billion. Seems reasonable but the
difficulty is they are double-counting because they, in theory but not
necessarily in practice, already get 17% of the national budget. You’d think
this issue could be resolved in negotiation. It is ridiculous that Iraq’s
development is being held back because of childish petty infighting. This is
one reason we need free and fair parliamentary elections swiftly. January 2014
is just not soon enough. And we do not need the streets in chaos to do it. This
spill over of Syria into Iraq bodes ill.
Bahrain
Elsewhere things bode
well. Another country facing elections in 2014, though fortunately perhaps
towards the end of the year, is Bahrain. Their ‘national dialogue’ has just got
underway and the opposition would like to see it lead to powersharing with a
constitutional monarchy. At least there is something going on to try and find a
way forward. The key issue is to strengthen those calling for moderation like Sheikh Isa Qasim, Bahrain’s most
influential Shi’a cleric. The difficulty from the government’s perspective is
that more and more Bahrainis are rejecting parliamentary democracy in favour of
street protest. If we see the mainstream opposition fail to participate in the
2014 elections, it bodes ill for Bahrain’s future and indeed for the future of
the moderate opposition.
The deaths of both a protester and a policeman at Friday's
demonstrations might complicate the national dialogue process which had been
helped by the government agreeing to become a "party" to the talks,
instead of just a "convening" entity between the "loyalist"
and "opposition" political societies.
Ultimately however, political reform will probably only succeed if
the Government of Bahrain is permitted by the Saudis to sacrifice the
long-standing Prime Minister (Bahrain has the longest serving premier in the
world and his removal is a key opposition demand).
On
Iran
The forthcoming elections
in Iran bode well for the future too, largely because they mark the end of President
Ahmadinejad. Key contenders are Valiyati and Qalibaf. Qalibaf (Mohammad-Bagher
Ghalibaf) is the one to watch. He is a pilot and he’s good with media. He was a
General in the IRGC and is Mayor of Tehran. He knows Europe. He did many
positive things whilst in charge of Tehran. His emphasis is on the economy. He
is not radical, not narrow minded. He is middle-aged. Valiyati could win and has
his own network, but he’s an old man now.
The reformists will also
put forward a candidate of course. It will be either Mohammad-Ali Najafi or Hassan Rohani or Mohammad-Reza Aref – just one of them.
Perhaps 20 candidates
will stand in all. But there are four principal groups:
- The Ahmajinedati
- The Principalists
- The Reformists
- The Independents
These groups will all watch
each other hopefully ensuring that the elections are reasonably fair this time.
The Principalists and the Reformists are pragmatic. The election will be in
June.
Better times ahead then?
Maybe. But if the Syrian civil war spills into Iraq all bets are on hold. Here
at the NCF we will be focussing on Iraq a little more in the coming months. Do
not expect us to pull our punches.
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